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Privacy Preserving and Delegated Access Control for Cloud
Applications
Xinfeng Ye
Abstract: In cloud computing applications, users’ data and applications are hosted by cloud providers. This paper
proposed an access control scheme that uses a combination of discretionary access control and cryptographic
techniques to secure users’ data and applications hosted by cloud providers. Many cloud applications require users
to share their data and applications hosted by cloud providers. To facilitate resource sharing, the proposed scheme
allows cloud users to delegate their access permissions to other users easily. Using the access control policies
that guard the access to resources and the credentials submitted by users, a third party can infer information about
the cloud users. The proposed scheme uses cryptographic techniques to obscure the access control policies and
users’ credentials to ensure the privacy of the cloud users. Data encryption is used to guarantee the confidentiality
of data. Compared with existing schemes, the proposed scheme is more flexible and easy to use. Experiments
showed that the proposed scheme is also efficient.
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1

Introduction

In cloud computing, cloud providers host the data and
applications for cloud users. Data encryption has been
used[1, 2] to ensure the confidentiality of the data stored
on cloud providers. However, a cloud provider not only
stores users’ data, it also hosts the applications that
its users execute. Thus, using mechanisms to control
the access to these applications and data is another
approach of securing users’ assets hosted by cloud
providers. In this paper, data and applications are called
digital assets or assets in short.
Fine-grained access control has been used in cloud
computing[3, 4] . In fine-grained access control schemes,
an access control policy is created for each data item.
When a data item is accessed, the cloud providers carry
out policy enforcement according to the access control
policy of the data item. A user can only access a
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data item if the user’s credentials satisfy the data item’s
access policy.
Many
cloud
applications,
e.g.,
cloud
[5]
manufacturing , require close collaboration of
the users. This means that a user’s assets hosted by
a cloud provider need to be accessed by other users.
For this type of applications, the access control scheme
should allow the delegation of access permission.
Access permission delegation means a user, say Alice,
delegates her access permission on a data item or an
application to another user, say Bob. This allows Bob to
carry out operations on the data item or the application
on behalf of Alice.
Xu et al.[6] and Liu and Zic[7] proposed schemes
that allow access permission delegation. However, both
schemes do not consider delegating access permissions
on the data items that are jointly owned by multiple
users. In practice, joint ownership frequently occurs.
For example, when two companies jointly develop a
product, the data concerning the product is jointly
owned. This means that a contractor working on the
product must be vetted by both companies. Therefore,
it is important to develop an access control scheme
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that allows the delegation of access permissions in
the presence of joint ownership on data items or
applications.
An issue with many existing access control schemes,
e.g., Refs. [8, 9], etc., is that they do not hide the policies
or the credentials that are used in access control. Ye and
Khoussainov[10] showed that the access control policies
and users’ credentials can reveal some secrets of the
data’s owners and the holders of the credentials. Using
meaningless names for the attributes in policies and
credentials does not always solve the problem. This is
because, with sufficient amount of access control rules
and credentials, it is possible to infer the meaning of the
attributes[11] .
Much research has been carried out to ensure
the confidentiality of data and the privacy of their
access control policies[2, 12–14] . However, none of these
schemes allow access permission delegation; and most
of these schemes are not practical due to usability
limitations[15] .
This paper proposed an access control scheme for
cloud applications. The scheme uses a fine-grained
attribute-based access control approach and allows the
delegation of access permissions to be carried out easily
in the presence of joint ownership of digital assets.
The scheme guarantees both the confidentiality of data
and the privacy of the access control policies and the
credentials used for access control. Compared with
existing schemes, the proposed scheme is more flexible
and practical to use.
This paper is organized as below. Section 2 describes
some concepts of cryptography. Section 3 shows the
details of the proposed scheme. Section 4 measures
the execution time of the scheme. Comparisons with
existing works and conclusions are given in Sections 5
and 6, respectively.

2

The Basics of Cryptography

This paper uses the cryptosystem developed in our
earlier work[10] for hiding the contents of the access
control rules and the credentials. The study in Ref. [10]
is based on the RSA algorithm[16] and the scheme by
Ray et al.[17] This section introduces some concepts of
cryptography. The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in
Ref. [10].
Definition 1 Two integers, a and b, are relatively
prime if their greatest common divisor is 1. That is,
gcd.a; b/ D 1.

41

Definition 2 Euler’s totient function '.N / is
defined
as:
8
ˆ
if N is prime,
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
< '.N / D N 1I
if N D N1 N2    Nk and
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ 8i; j W Œ1::k:Ni and Nj are relatively prime,
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
: '.N / D '.N /'.N /    '.N /:
1

2

k

Definition 3 A key K is a pair he; N i, where N is
a product of distinct primes and e is relatively prime to
'.N /; e is the exponent and N is the base of key K.
Definition 4 The encryption of a message m with
key K D he; N i, denoted as Œm; K, is defined as


m; he; N i D me mod N:
Definition 5 The matching key of key K D he; N i,
denoted as K 1 , is a pair hd; N i, satisfying ed 
1 mod '.N / where “” is the congruence modulo
relation. K can decrypt the message encrypted using
K 1 , and
h vice versa. That
i his,
i
Œm; K; K

1

D Œm; K

1

; K D m:

In the RSA cryptosystem, a pair of matching keys is
called a public/private key pair.
Definition 6 Two keys K1 D he1 ; N1 i and K2 D
he2 ; N2 i are compatible if e1 D e2 and N1 and N2 are
relatively prime.
Definition 7 If two keys K1 D he; N1 i and K2 D
he; N2 i are compatible, then the product key, K1  K2 ,
is defined as he; N1 N2 i.
Theorem 1 Let Ki D he; Ni i where 1 6 i 6 n be
compatible keys. For any message m such that m 6 Ni ,
h
i
Œm; K1  K2      Kn ; KO 1 D m;
where KO 1 is the matching key of key KO and
KO D Kx1  Kx2      Kxp such that
1 6 xi 6 n, 1 6 i 6 p, and xi ¤ xj if i ¤ j .
In Theorem 1, KO is a key that is formed by a subset
of the keys in set K1 ; K2 ;    ; Kn . Theorem 1 states
that, if a message is encrypted using a product key that
is formed with all the keys in K1 ; K2 ;    ; Kn , then the
O i.e., KO 1 , can be used to decrypt
matching key of K,
the encrypted message. For example, assume that K1 ,
K2 , and K3 are compatible keys, a message encrypted
with product key K1  K2  K3 can be decrypted using
any one of the keys in set:
(
)
K1 1 ; K2 1 ; K3 1 ; .K1  K2 / 1 ; .K1  K3 / 1 ;
:
.K2  K3 / 1 ; .K1  K2  K3 / 1
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3
3.1

The Scheme
An overview of the scheme

The proposed scheme uses a fine-grained attributebased access control approach. In fine-grained
attribute-based access control, a set of access control
rules specifies the conditions under which access to a
digital asset is granted. The rules are defined in terms
of the attributes that a user might possess, e.g., radar
designer, etc.
Cloud providers store their users’ digital assets. Each
asset has an access control list containing rules that
allow users to access the asset based on the attributes
possessed by the users. An access control list specifies
three access modes: read, write, and execute. Each
mode has a set of access control rules. A user may
access an asset in a given mode if the user satisfies the
access control rule for that access mode.
The owner of an asset delegates the access permission
of the asset to other users by setting the access control
rule for each of the access modes of the asset. A user
that satisfies the access control rule of an asset is called
a delegate. For each access mode, the owner also
specifies whether a delegate can further delegate her
access permission to other users. If further delegation
is allowed, the delegates can delegate their permissions
to other users by specifying their own access control
rules. Thus, a chain of delegation can be formed for
each access mode of the asset. The users high up in
the chain can revoke the delegations to the users lower
down in the chain. For example, Alice specified access
control rules for read and write operations on her asset
respectively. Alice also indicated that the read operation
can be further delegated while the write operation
cannot. Assume that Bob satisfies both Alice’s access
control rules. Bob can delegate his read permission on
Alice’s asset by specifying his own access control rule
while he cannot delegate his write permission on Alice’s
asset.
The users that have access permission on an asset
are called the authorized users. Each authorized user
defines her own set of attributes, and assigns the
attributes to the users that she wants to delegate
access permission. An authorized user issues credential
certificate to her delegates. A credential certificate
states the attributes that an authorized user assigned
to her delegate. A user can acquire attributes from
multiple authorized users. As a result, the user will be
issued multiple credential certificates. An authorized

user stores her delegates’ credential certificates on cloud
providers.
It is assumed that the cloud providers are honest
but curious. They honestly execute the access control
scheme. When a user, say Bob, wants to operate on
an asset hosted by a cloud provider, say cp, cp decides
whether the operation can be carried out by checking
Bob’s credentials (i.e., attributes) against the access
control rules of the asset for the given operation.
To prevent a third party from inferring information
from the access control rules and credentials, access
control rules and credentials should not be stored in
clear text. In order to obscure the access control rules
and credentials, the cryptographic system developed in
Ref. [10] is used. A pair of matching keys is used
to encrypt and decrypt information for the purpose of
access control. The access control rules of an asset are
converted to a set of decryption keys called rule keys.
The credentials of a user are converted to an encryption
key called credential key. If and only if the credentials
satisfy the access control rules, the credential key and
one of the rule keys form a matching key pair. That
is, the information encrypted by the credential key can
be decrypted by the rule key. Thus, when a cloud
provider, say cp, checks whether the credentials of a
user, say Bob, satisfies the access control rule of a
digital asset, say DA, cp uses Bob’s credential key to
encrypt a random string. If the encrypted string can be
decrypted correctly using DA’s rule key, it means that
the credential key (i.e., Bob’s credentials) and the rule
key (i.e., the access control rule of DA) form a matching
key pair. That is, Bob’s credentials satisfy DA’s access
control rule. Otherwise, it means the two keys do not
form a matching key pair. That is, Bob’s credentials
do not satisfy DA’s access rule. Since the keys are
sequences of bytes, even if the cloud provider knows
the keys, the provider does not understand the contents
of the rule or the credentials. Thus, the privacy of the
access control rule and the credentials is ensured.
The conversions of the rules and credentials to keys
are carried out by authorized users when they create
their access control rules and assign attributes to their
delegates. Thus, only the authorized users know (a) the
mapping between the access control rules of the digital
assets and the rule keys, and (b) the mapping between
the users’ credentials and their credential keys.
To ensure the confidentiality of digital assets, data
encryption and program obfuscation can be used.
Obfuscation can make applications hard to understand
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by human[18] . This paper only investigates using
encryption to secure the data stored on the cloud
provider.
Each user has a pair of public/private keys. The
public keys are kept by the cloud provider and the
users hold their private keys. A data owner encrypts a
data item using a symmetric-key encryption algorithm
before the data is stored on the cloud provider. The
secret key used to encrypt/decrypt the data item is
encrypted using the public keys of the users that have
permissions to access the data. The encrypted secret
keys are stored on the cloud providers. If a user satisfies
an access control rule of a data item, the user will be
given the encrypted data item and the encrypted secret
key. The user decrypts the encrypted secret key using
her private key, and obtains the data item by decrypting
it using the secret key. Since the data and the secret keys
are encrypted, the cloud providers cannot read the data
or the secret keys in clear text. Thus, the confidentiality
of the data is ensured.
A user needs to authenticate with the cloud provider
before accessing an asset. It is assumed that a public
key authentication scheme[19] is used to establish the
identity of each user.
3.2

Access control rules

The access control rule given by an authorized user is
represented as a logic expression in disjunctive normal
form. For example, if a rule states that an asset can
only be read by users who have attributes A and B or
attributes A and C , the logic expression representing the
rule is “.A ^ B/ _ .A ^ C /”. If the attributes possessed
by a user satisfy one of the disjuncts in the expression,
the user satisfies the rule.
The attributes used in the access control rules of
an authorized user are defined by the authorized user.
There is no need for the authorized users to agree on
the meaning of the attributes defined by them. This is
because the authorized users do not need to understand
each other’s access control rules. In practice, people
from different industries or disciplines might work
together on a project. For example, a manufacture
and a marketing company might set up a joint venture
to produce and sell a product. The manufacturer
and the marketing company are likely to use different
terminologies. For the authorized users, the freedom
of using their self-defined attributes in specifying the
access control rules makes the scheme flexible and easy
for the authorized users to use as they do not need to
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adopt attributes that they are not familiar with.
3.3

Joint ownership

An asset might be jointly owned by multiple users
ui .1 6 i 6 n/. For example, two companies are
working together to make a product. The information
and the data for the product are owned by both
companies.
The co-owners of an asset set their access control
rules for the asset independently. The co-owners must
agree on the number of co-owners’ access control rules
that a user must satisfy in order to be granted access
permission of the asset. For example, if Alice, Bob,
and Carol jointly own an asset, they might specify that
a user must satisfy the rules of at least two co-owners in
order to be granted access permission of the asset. An
m-out-of-n access control rule can be represented as:
_
^
.
ri /
(1)

r 2S
S 2P .[16i6n fri g/ ^.jS jDm/

i

In the formula above, ri is the access control rule
given by co-owner ui . [16i6n fri g represents the set of
the rules given by all the co-owners. P .[16i 6n fri g/ is
the power set of [16i 6n fri g. jS j denotes the cardinality
of set S .
The m-out-of-n access control rule has two special
cases. They are (a) the access control rules of all coowners must be satisfied (i.e., m D n), and (b) only
one co-owner’s access control rule needs to be satisfied
(i.e., m D 1). For the two special cases, the degenerate
forms of the formula are ^n1 ri (i.e., m D n) and _n1 ri
(i.e., m D 1), respectively.
3.4

Delegation

The owner of an asset specifies the original access
control rule for various access modes of the asset. The
users that satisfy the access control rules can carry
out the corresponding operations on the asset. These
users are the delegates of the owner as well as the
authorized users as they satisfy the owner’s access
control rules. If the owner of the asset allows the
access permission to be delegated, the authorized users
can delegate their permissions by specifying their own
access control rules for the asset. An authorized user
can also specify whether her delegates can delegate
their access permission.
For example, assume that (a) Alice created a file and
specified that users with attribute A can read the file
and delegate their read permission, (b) A is an attribute
issued by Alice, and (c) Bob and Carol both have been
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given attribute A by Alice. Thus, Bob and Carol can
read the file. Bob might delegate his read permission
by specifying a rule allowing users with attribute B
(issued by Bob) to read the file. Similarly, Carol might
delegate her permission by stating a rule allowing the
users with attribute C (issued by Carol) to read the
file. Apart from specifying their access control rules,
Bob and Carol also indicate whether their delegates can
further delegate their read permission. Assume that Bob
allows his delegates to delegate their read permission
while Carol does not. If Jimmy is given attribute B
by Bob and Susan is assigned attribute C by Carol,
Jimmy and Susan will be able to read the file. Jimmy
can also delegate his read permission to other users by
specifying his own access control rules. Susan is not
able to delegate her read permission to others as Carol
does not allow her delegates to do so.
In the presence of permission delegation, the access
control rules for each access mode of an asset are
organized as a delegation tree with the asset owner’s
rule stored at the root of the tree. The children of a
node are the rules of the delegates of the node. The
rules of the users in the above example are stored in
the tree shown in Fig. 1. The root of the tree stores
the rules given by Alice (i.e., the owner of the file).
Bob’s and Carol’s rules are stored as the children of
the root of the tree since Bob and Carol need to satisfy
the rules given by Alice. Bob and Carol delegate their
permissions to Jimmy and Susan, respectively. Jimmy
only needs to satisfy Bob’s rule. Hence, Jimmy’s rule is
stored below Bob’s rule. For the same reason, Susan’s
rule is stored below Carol’s rule. Jimmy can have child
nodes representing Jimmy’s delegates. Susan must be a
leaf node as Carol does not allow Susan to delegate her
read permission.
For jointly owned assets, the root of the delegation
tree stores the combined access control rule of the coW
V

owners, i.e.,
. ri 2S ri /,
S 2P .[
fr g/ ^.jS jDm/
16i6n

i

where ri is the rule set by co-owner ui as explained in
Section 3.3. For example, Fig. 2 shows the delegation
tree of an access mode of a file that was jointly created
Alice

Bob

Carol

Jimmy

Susan

Fig. 1

Delegation tree.

Alice and Ted

Bob
Fig. 2

Carol

Delegation tree for jointly owned asset.

by Alice and Ted. It is assumed that (a) Alice and
Ted require a user must satisfy both Alice’s and Ted’s
policy to gain read permission on the file, (b) Alice and
Ted allow the read permission to be further delegated
by their delegates, and (c) Bob and Carol both satisfy
Alice’s and Ted’s policy. In Fig. 2, the root of the
tree stores the logical conjunction of the rules given by
Alice and Ted since both Alice’s and Ted’s rule must be
satisfied.
The cloud provider is responsible for maintaining
the delegation trees. It constructs the logic expression
representing the m-out-of-n access control rule
according to the requirements given by the co-owners
of an asset. It only allows a user to create her own
access control rules if the parent of the user in the
delegation tree indicates that the user can delegate her
access permission.
3.5

Distributing public keys

Each user has a pair of public/private keys. The keys
are used for authentication, access control, and ensuring
the confidentiality of data items. Since not every user is
willing to obtain a X.509 certificate from a certificate
authority, the proposed scheme relies on a chain of trust
to distribute users’ public keys.
When the owner of an asset, say Alice, signs a
contract with a cloud provider for hosting her assets,
Alice generates a pair of public/private keys. Alice
gives her public key to the cloud provider. The cloud
provider uses a public key authentication scheme to
establish the identity of each user. Thus, Alice’s public
key will be used by the cloud provider to authenticate
Alice.
When Alice assigns an attribute to another user,
say Bob, Bob generates a pair of public/private keys
and gives his public key to Alice. Alice passes Bob’s
public key to the cloud provider. As the cloud provider
has Alice’s public key, Alice can be authenticated by
the cloud provider using a public key authentication
mechanism. Thus, the cloud provider is sure that the
information received from Alice is sent by Alice.
Hence, the cloud provider can be certain that the key
given by Alice does belong to a person that Alice
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regards as Bob. Since the cloud provider carries out
access control on behalf of Alice, as long as Alice
is satisfied that the public key belongs to Bob, it
is sufficient for the cloud provider to use the public
key to identify Bob in the public key authentication
mechanism.
If Bob delegates his access permission to another
user, say Carol, Carol gives her public key to Bob. Bob
passes Carol’s public key to the cloud server. As the
cloud provider has Bob’s public key, it can authenticate
Bob. Thus, the provider can trust that the key given by
Bob does belong to a person that Bob regards as Carol.
Similarly, Carol can give her delegates’ public keys to
the cloud provider. There is no limit on the depth of the
access permission delegation. It can be seen that a chain
of trust, i.e., “cloud provider ! Alice ! Bob ! Carol”
in the above example, is formed while the delegation of
permission is carried out. Using this chain, the cloud
provider can collect the public keys of all the users.
3.6

Obscuring credentials

When an authorized user, say Alice, delegates her
access permission to other users, Alice needs to specify
an access control rule in terms of the attributes that
she defines. Alice assigns the attributes to the users to
whom she wants to delegate her permission. Authorized
users define their own attributes. They do not need to
coordinate with each other in defining their attributes.
This makes it easier for the users to use the system.
An authorized user might give multiple attributes to
a delegate. The delegates credential should include all
these attributes. An authorized user issues credential
certificates to her delegates and gives all the credential
certificates to the cloud provider. Since the certificates
are sent by the delegator to the cloud provider directly,
they cannot be tampered by the delegates. Thus, the
cloud provider can be assured of their authenticity.
In order to obscure the credentials, for each attribute
defined by an authorized user, the authorized user
creates an attribute key that conforms to Definition 3
in Section 2. An attribute key is used to represent the
attribute possessed by a user. For an authorized user,
all the attribute keys generated by the authorized user
have the same exponent, different bases, and the bases
are relatively prime to each other. Thus, according to
Definition 6 in Section 2, the attribute keys generated
by one authorized user are compatible with each other.
Algorithm 1 is used by an authorized user to generate
an attribute key. In Algorithm 1, since p1 and p2 are
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Algorithm 1
Generating attribute keys
GenerateKey(e, uprimes)
Input: e is the exponent of all the keys;
uprimes is a set containing all the
primes that have already been
used to construct attribute
keys by the authorized user
Output: a key that is compatible to all the
existing attribute keys
// find two un-used distinctive primes that
// conform to Definition 3
1. find two primes, p1 and p2 such that
.p1 ¤ p2 / ^ .p1 … uprimes/^
.p2 … uprimes/ ^ .gcd.e; '.p1  p2 // D 1/
// record p1 and p2 as used primes
2. uprimes
uprimes [ fp1 ; p2 g
// the new key is he; p1  p2 i
3. return he; p1  p2 i

different from all the primes in uprimes, p1  p2 must
be relatively prime to the product of any two primes in
uprimes. Thus, according to Definition 6, the new key
must be compatible with all the existing keys.
If a user, say Bob, is given a single attribute
by an authorized user, say Alice, the attribute key
that corresponds to Bob’s attribute is used as Bob’s
credential. If Alice assigns several attributes to Bob,
Bob’s credential is represented by the product key
that is formed by the keys corresponding to each
of Bob’s attributes. For example, if (a) Alice has
assigned attributes A1 ; A2 ;    , and An to Bob, and
(b) K1 ; K2 ;    , and Kn are the corresponding attribute
keys of A1 ; A2 ;    , and An , respectively, Bob’s
credential is represented as K1  K2      Kn . The
product key is a pair he; N i where N D N1 N2    Nn
and Ki D he; Ni i .1 6 i 6 n/.
Only Alice knows how to map an attribute defined by
her to its corresponding attribute key. Hence, the key
representing the credential of a user cannot be easily
linked back to any attribute by Bob or any third party,
e.g., the cloud provider. That is, only Alice understands
the meaning of the credentials that she assigns to other
users. Hence, the meanings of the user’s credentials are
kept secret.
3.7

Obscuring access control rules

As described in Section 3.2, the access control rule
given by a user is represented in a disjunctive normal
form, e.g., “.A ^ B/ _ .A ^ C /”. The rule is given to
the cloud provider for enforcing access control on the
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user’s asset. In order to make the access control rule
incomprehensible to the cloud provider, each disjunct
in a rule is mapped to a key, i.e., a sequence of bytes.
As described in Section 3.6, each attribute is mapped
to an attribute key. Using the attribute keys, a product
key corresponding to each disjunct in an access control
rule can be obtained. The product key is generated
using the keys of the attributes in the disjunct. For
example, for “.A ^ B/”, A’s and B’s attribute keys
(i.e., KA and KB ) are used to generate the product
key KA  KB . Once the product key is obtained,
.KA  KB /’s matching key, i.e., .KA  KB / 1 , is
calculated. .KA  KB / 1 is called a rule key. A rule
key is used to represent the corresponding disjunct in an
access control rule. Thus, a rule will be converted into
several rule keys. For example, rule “.A^B/_.A^C /”
is converted into keys .KA  KB / 1 and .KA  KC / 1 .
Algorithm 2 describes how to convert a rule to a set
of rule keys. AttributeToKey is a function that maps
an attribute to its corresponding attribute key. Each
authorized user uses Algorithm 2 to convert her access
control rule to a set of rule keys. The keys are given to
the cloud provider for rule enforcement.
3.8

Rule enforcement

Originally, an access control rule is a logic expression
in disjunctive normal form. According to Section 3.7,
each rule is converted to a set of rule keys. Each key
corresponds to the conditions specified in a disjunct of
the logic expression. Thus, as long as one of the keys
can be used to determine that a user’s credential makes
the corresponding disjunct evaluate to true, the access
control rule is satisfied by the user. If an asset is jointly
owned by several authorized users, the user must satisfy
the access control rules of at least m authorized users as
discussed in Section 3.3.
As explained in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, users’ public
keys and credential certificates are stored on the cloud
provider. A user that wants to carry out operations
on an asset hosted by a cloud provider needs to use
a public key authentication mechanism to prove his
identity to the cloud provider. The cloud provider
can verify a user’s identity using the public key of the
user. After a user is authenticated, the cloud provider
carries out some encryption and decryption operations
using the user’s credentials (i.e., the credential keys
contained in the user’s certificates) and the rule keys of
the asset that the user wants to access. The outcomes
of these operations determine whether the user satisfies

Algorithm 2 Generating rule keys
ObscureRule(Rule)
Input: Rule is the access control rule for an
access mode of an asset
Output: a set of rule keys
// Keys is a set holding the converted rule keys
1.
Keys
∅;
// an access control rule is in disjunctive
// normal form
2.
let Rule D t1 _ t2 _    _ tn
// find the rule key for each disjunct in the rule
3.
for each ti where 1 6 i 6 n in Rule do f
// each disjunct is a conjunction of one or
// more attributes
// AttrKeys is a set that includes the
// attribute keys of all the attributes in ti
4.
let ti D r1 ^ r2 ^    ^ rm and
AttrKeys=
fAttributeToKey.rj /j1 6 j 6 mg
// K is a product key that corresponds to ti
5.
K
K1  K2      Km
where Ki 2 AttrKeys
and Ki ¤ Kj for i ¤ j
6.
let K D he; N i
// compute K’s matching key, i.e., the rule
// key that corresponds to disjunct ti
7.
compute K 1 such that
K 1 D hd; N i
where e  d  1 mod '.N /
8.
Keys
Keys [ fK 1 g
9.
g // end of for each
10. return Keys

the access control rules of the asset.
A rule enforcement example is given below. Assume
that (a) a user, say Bob, has been given attributes A1
and A2 by Alice and attributes T1 and T2 by Ted, (b)
Alice and Ted jointly own an asset, (c) “.A1 ^ A3 / _
A2 _ .A3 ^ A4 /” and “.T1 ^ T3 / _ .T1 ^ T2 /” are the
access control rules set by Alice and Ted, respectively,
(d) Alice and Ted require users to satisfy both their
access control rules in order to access the asset, and
(e) the key assigned to attributes A1 ; A2 ; A3 ; A4 ; T1 ; T2 ,
and T3 are KA1 ; KA2 ; KA3 ; KA4 ; KT1 ; KT2 , and KT3 ,
respectively. To access the asset, Bob needs to satisfy
both Alice’s and Ted’s rules. It can be seen that, in
order to satisfy a disjunct in a rule, the attributes that
appear in the disjunct must be a subset of the attributes
possessed by Bob. According to the assumption, the
set of attributes that Bob has been given by Alice and
Ted is fA1 ; A2 ; T1 ; T2 g. The attributes appearing in
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disjunct “.A1 ^ A3 /” of Alice’s access control rule form
set fA1 ; A3 g which is not a subset of fA1 ; A2 ; T1 ; T2 g.
As Bob does not have attribute A3 , Bob cannot satisfy
disjunct “.A1 ^ A3 /” in Alice’s rule. According to
Section 3.6, the credential given to Bob by Alice is the
product key KA1  KA2 . From Section 3.7, .KA1 
KA3 / 1 ; KA21 , and .KA3  KA4 / 1 are the rule keys
corresponding to disjunct “.A1 ^ A3 /”, “A2 ”, and
“.A3 ^ A4 /”, respectively. To check whether Bob’s
credential satisfies Alice’s access control rule, the cloud
provider checks whether one of the disjuncts in Alice’s
access control rule can be satisfied by Bob’s credential.
First, the cloud provider generates a random string
T and encrypts T using key KA1  KA2 (i.e., Bob’s
credential key given by Alice) to obtain ciphered text
CT (i.e., CT D ŒT; KA1  KA2 ). To test whether Bob’s
credential satisfies “.A1 ^ A3 /”, the cloud provider
uses key .KA1  KA3 / 1 (i.e., the rule key representing
disjunct “.A1 ^ A3 /”) to decrypt CT. Since “KA1 
KA2 ¤ KA1  KA3 ”, .KA1  KA3 / 1 is not the
matching key of KA1  KA2 . As a result, .KA1 
KA3 / 1 cannot decrypt CT. Since the decryption fails,
it is regarded as Bob does not satisfy the disjunct
“.A1 ^ A3 /” that is represented by .KA1  KA3 / 1 .
Similarly, when examining whether Bob’s credential
satisfies “A2 ”, the scheme uses rule key KA21 (i.e., the
rule key representing disjunct “A2 ” in Alice’s access
control rule) to decrypt CT. Let KO D KA2 in Theorem 1
in Section 2. Thus, “KO 1 D KA21 ” holds. According to
i
h
Theorem 1 in Section 2, “ ŒT; KA1  KA2 ; KA21 D T ”
holds. As the decryption is successful, it is regarded
that the credential provided by Bob satisfies the disjunct
(i.e., “A2 ”) that is represented by rule key KA21 . In
a disjunctive normal form, if one of the disjuncts is
satisfied, the whole logic expression evaluates to true.
Thus, if Bob satisfies A2 , Bob satisfies Alice’s rule. The
other disjunct (i.e., “.A3 ^ A4 /”) does not need to be
checked. To access the asset, Bob also needs to satisfy
Ted’s policy. The same method is used when checking
whether Bob’s credential satisfies Ted’s access control
rule.
Algorithm 3 checks whether a credential key satisfies
the rule given by an authorized user. checknextdisjunct
indicates whether there is a need to check the next
disjunct in the access control rule expression (line 5). If
one disjunct in the rule expression is true (i.e., the rule
key can decrypt CT), the rule is satisfied. Thus, there
is no need to check the rest of the disjuncts in the rule
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Algorithm 3 Checking credential key
CredSatisfiesRule(key, Rule)
1.
Input: Rule is the set of rule keys
key is the credential key of a user
2.
Output: whether key satisfies Rule (i.e., true
or false)
3.
generate a random string T
// encrypt string T with the user’s credential
// key key
4.
CT
ŒT; key
5.
checknextdisjunct
True
// each rule key in set Rule is used to
// decrypt CT
O in Rule do f
6.
for each key
O then
7.
if .T D ŒCT; key/
8.
checknextdisjunct
false
9.
break
10.
end-if
11. end-for-each
12. if .checknextdisjunct/ then
13.
return false
14. end-if
15. return true

expression (lines 7 to 10).
Algorithm 4 defines the rule enforcement process
that a cloud provider follows when it checks whether
a user can be granted access permission to an asset.
An asset might be jointly owned by several authorized
users. Argument m specifies the minimum number of
authorized users’ rules that a user needs to satisfy in
order to be granted access permission. Rules is a set of
rule keys set representing all the rules given by various
authorized users of an asset. Each element in Rules is
the set of rule keys representing the access control rule
of one authorized user.
numOfSatisfiedRule records the number of access
control rules that are satisfied by the user’s credential
so far (line 1). The cloud provider checks a user’s
credential against the access control rule of each
authorized user (line 2). A user might have several
credential certificates issued by various authorized
users. cert.issuer is the ID of the issuer of a
certificate. An access control rule given by an
authorized user should be evaluated against the
credential issued by the same authorized user. For
example, if Bob wants to access an asset whose
access control rule is set by Alice, Alice’s rule should
be checked against the credential issued to Bob by
Alice. Thus, the correct credential certificate needs
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Algorithm 4 Enforcing rule
RuleEnforcement(m; Rules; Certificates)
Input: m is the minimum number of access
control rules that the user needs to
satisfy
Rules is a set of rule keys set
representing the access control
rules of authorized users
Certificates is a set of credential
certificates of the user whose
credential is being checked
Output: grant or deny
// initialise numOfSatisfiedRule
1.
numOfSatisfiedRule
0
2.
for each rule in Rules do f
3.
let rule be the access control rule set by
user au
4.
let cert be a certificate in Certificates
such that cert.issuer D au
5.
if (cert does not exist) then continue end-if
6.
extract credential key key from cert
7.
if CredSatisfiesRule(key; rule) then
8.
numOfSatisfiedRule
numOfSatisfiedRule C 1
9.
if numOfSatisfiedRulehm then
10.
continue
11.
else
12.
return grant
13.
end-if
14. end-if
15. end-for-each
16. return deny

to be identified when an access rule is checked (line
4). If the user has not been issued any credential
by the authorized user that created the access control
rule, the user cannot satisfy the rule. As the user
is granted access permission as long as the user can
satisfy m of all the access control rules, failing one
rule does not mean that the user should be denied
access permission. Thus, the next access control
rule is checked (line 5). Otherwise, the credential key
is retrieved from the certificate to check whether it
satisfies the rule (lines 6 and 7). numOfSatisfiedRule is
incremented when an access control rule is satisfied
(line 8). Once the user has satisfied sufficient number
of access control rules (i.e., numOfSatisfied > m),
the user is granted access permission (lines 11 and
12). Otherwise, the access control rule of another
authorized user is examined (lines 9 and 10). If the
number of access control rules that are satisfied by the
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user cannot reach the required number (i.e., m) when all
the access control rules have been checked, the access
request is declined (line 16).
3.9

Ensuring data confidentiality

Encryption is used to ensure data confidentiality. The
proposed scheme uses an encryption mechanism that is
similar to the approach by Gonzalez-Manzano et al.[20]
The owner of a data item encrypts her data item using
a symmetric-key encryption algorithm, e.g., AES. Each
data item is encrypted with its own unique secret key.
The secret key needs to be given to all the users that
have permission to access the data. For each data item,
the authorized user asks the cloud provider to find out
all her delegates that satisfy her access control rule for
the data item. For each delegate that satisfies the access
control rule of a data item, the authorized user uses the
public key of the delegate to encrypt the secret key that
is used to encrypt the data item. The encrypted secret
keys are stored with their corresponding data items on
the cloud provider. When a user accesses a data item, if
the user satisfies the access control rule of the data item,
the cloud provider gives the encrypted data item as well
as its encrypted secret key to the user. The user decrypts
the encrypted secret key using her private key to obtain
the secret key. Then, the secret key is used to obtain the
plain text of the data item.
Jointly owned data only need to be encrypted by one
of the co-owners since the purpose of encrypting a data
item is to keep the cloud provider from knowing the
clear text of the data. Thus, encrypting the data once
would prevent the cloud provider from understanding
the content of the data. The co-owners need to reach
an agreement on the secret key being used to encrypt
the data item. Thus, all the co-owners can decrypt the
encrypted data when they need it.
Storing the encrypted secret keys on the cloud
providers relieves the authorized users from distributing
the encrypted keys to their delegates. As the secret keys
are encrypted, the cloud provider cannot find out the
clear text of the keys. Hence, it is not able to use the
key to decrypt the encrypted data.
Cloud providers use Algorithm 5 to find the delegates
that satisfy a user’s access control rule. Algorithm 5
is invoked when the access control rule for an asset is
created or changed. It is also applied to each data item
of an authorized user when the authorized user assigns
a new attribute to her delegate. This is because these
changes might result in some users satisfying the access
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Algorithm 5 Finding conforming delegates
FindConformingDelegate(au, data)
Input: au is the ID of an authorized user
data denotes a data item
Output: a set of users that satisfy au’s access
control rule for data
1.
let Rule be the set of rule keys that corresponds
to au’s access control rule for data
2.
let Certificates be a set of credential
certificates issued by au
// initialize conformDelegate
3.
conformDelegate
∅
4.
for each cert in Certificates do f
5.
extract key from cert
6.
if CredSatisfiesRule(key; Rule) then
7.
conformDelegate
conformDelegate[ fcert’s holder g
8.
else
9.
remove the encrypted secret key
for cert’s holder
10. end-if
11. end-for-each
12. return conformDelegate

rule of the authorized user.
As explained in Sections 3.6 and 3.7, an authorized
user stores her access control rules and the credentials’
certificates that have been issued to other users on the
cloud providers. A cloud provider can find out the
access control rule set by authorized user au (line 1)
and all the credential certificates issued by au (line
2). Set conformDelegate contains the IDs of all the
users that satisfy au’s access control rule (line 3). Each
credential given by au is checked against au’s access
control rule for data (lines 4 and 5). Users satisfying
au’s access control rule are added to conformDelegate
(lines 6 and 7). If a user no longer satisfies au’s rule,
the user cannot access data. Thus, the encrypted secret
key that au generated for the user (if any) should be
deleted (lines 8 and 9). After each of the credentials
supplied by au is checked, the set of IDs of the users
that satisfy au’s access control rule is returned to user
au (line 12).
3.10

Speeding up the access control process

The access control rules and the credentials of the
users are stored on the cloud providers. Thus, a user’s
permission for accessing an asset can be determined by
the cloud providers before the user actually requests to
access the asset. This means that, instead of carrying
out the rule enforcement operation on the fly, the cloud
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providers can pre-compute a list of eligible users for
each access mode of an asset. When a user wants to
carry out an operation on an asset, the cloud provider
first verifies the user’s identity using a public key
authentication mechanism. If the identity of the user
can be established, the cloud provider just needs to look
up the list of eligible users to determine whether the
user’s access request can be granted. Thus, at run time,
the access control process becomes a simple look up
operation without involving the expensive encryption
and decryption operations.
3.11

Changing access control rules and credentials

An authorized user, say Alice, might change her access
control rule on an asset. After Alice’s rule is changed,
it is necessary to check whether Alice’s delegates can
satisfy Alice’s new rule. For the delegates that can no
longer meet the conditions in Alice’s new rule, their
encrypted secret keys for decrypting the data should be
deleted by the cloud provider. For Alice’s delegates
that have created their own rules on the asset, if a
delegate cannot satisfy Alice’s new rule, all the rules
that are in the sub-tree rooted at the delegate’s node in
the delegation tree should be deleted. For example, in
Fig. 1, after Alice changes her rule, it is necessary to
check whether Bob and Carol can satisfy Alice’s new
rule. If a user, say Bob, no longer satisfies Alice’s new
rule, Bob cannot delegate any permission to Jimmy. As
a result, Bob’s and Jimmy’s rules are deleted from the
delegation tree. The same reasoning applies to Carol.
Algorithm 6 is executed by the cloud provider when
a user, say au, changes her access control rule. In the
algorithm, c:creator is the ID of the user that created
the rule stored in node c of the delegation tree.
An authorized user, say Alice, might change the
credentials of her delegates (i.e., assign new attributes
or revoke all or some attributes issued to delegates).
If Alice revokes all the attributes of a delegate, say
Bob, Alice would tell the cloud provider to delete Bob’s
credential certificate issued by Alice. Otherwise, Alice
would issue a new credential certificate to Bob, and
gives the new certificate to the cloud provider.
After being notified by Alice, the cloud provider
scans through all the assets for which Alice has set
access control rules to find out whether Bob has used
his old credential to set his own access control rules on
these assets. If Bob’s new credential (if any) cannot
satisfy Alice’s rule, Bob’s rule and all the rules below
Bob’s node in the delegation tree are deleted. This is
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Algorithm 6 Updating delegation tree
PolicyCleanse(asset; au)
input: asset is the asset whose access control
rule is changed
au is the authorized user that sets an
access control rule on asset
1.
let R be the node holding user au’s access
control rule in asset’s delegation tree, and
Children be the set of R’s child nodes
// check whether each of au’s delegates
// satisfies au’s new rule
2.
for each c in Children do
// cert is the credential certificate that au
// issued to delegate c:creator
3.
let cert be the credential certificate of user
c:creator such that cert.issuer D au
// key is the credential key of
// delegate c:creator
4.
extract key from cert
// c:creator cannot satisfy au’s new rule
5.
if :CredSatisfiesRule(key, au’s rule) then
// the sub-tree rooted at node c is deleted
// by recursive call to Algorithm 6
6.
delete c:creator’s access control rule
from node c
7.
PolicyCleanse(asset; c:creator)
8.
delete the encrypted secret key
for c:creator
9.
delete node c
10.
end-if
11. end-for-each

because Bob can neither access the asset nor delegate
any access permission to other users.
Algorithm 7 is used by the cloud provider after a
user’s credential is changed. If a user, say del, has not
created any access control rule (i.e., if “rdel exists” in
line 6 of Algorithm 7 is false), the delegation tree is not
affected by the change of del’s credential. If del has not
been given a new certificate (i.e., “cert does not exist”
in line 6 is true), it means all the user’s attributes have
been revoked. cert.key in line 6 is del’s new credential
key.
When access control rules and user credentials are
changed, the authorized users only need to generate the
new rule keys and credential keys. The cloud provider
is responsible for checking whether the changes would
invalidate some access control rules. The secret keys for
encrypting data items are not affected by the changes
to rules and credentials. This is because the users
affected by the changes still need to go through the rule
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Algorithm 7 Revalidating delegate
CheckDelegate(au; del)
input: au is an authorized user that has changed
some attributes assigned to au’s delegate
del
1.
let DA be the set of assets that au has set
access rules
2.
let cert be del’s new credential certificate
given by au
3.
for each asset da in DA do
4.
let rau be the node storing au’s rule in da’s
delegation tree
5.
let rdel be a child node of rau and rdel
stores del’s access control rule
// actions to be taken when del’s new
// credential cannot satisfy au’s access
// control rule
6.
if .rdel exists/ ^ ..cert does not exist/_
:CredSatisfiesRule.cert.key; rau :rule//
then
// delete the sub-tree rooted at rdel by
// calling Algorithm 6
7.
delete del’s access control rule from rdel
8.
PolicyCleanse(da; del)
// If del cannot access the asset, its
// encrypted secret key need to be
// removed.
9.
delete the encrypted secret key for del
10.
delete node rdel
11.
end-if
12. end-for-each

enforcement process of the cloud provider to obtain the
data and the secret keys for decrypting the data. If they
can no longer meet the conditions specified in the access
control rules of the data, they will be denied the access
to the data and the secret key by the cloud provider.

4

Performance Evaluation

A prototype of the proposed scheme has been
implemented using Java to evaluate the execution cost
of the scheme. The evaluation was carried out on a Dell
Latitude E6540 with a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5-4310M
processor, 8 GB memory, and 64-bit Windows 7. In
all experiments, (a) the exponent of each key (i.e., e)
is 65 537, and (b) the rule key has a single disjunct (i.e.,
“Attr1 ^ Attr2 ^    ^ Attrn ” where 1 6 n 6 10).
The first experiment measures the time for generating
attribute keys using Algorithm 1 in Section 3.6. 10 000
keys were generated. The average time for generating
one key of various length is shown in Fig. 3. It can be
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seen that the time is comparable with generating a key
of the same size in the RSA algorithm. Thus, attribute
keys can be generated efficiently.
The second experiment evaluates (a) how the number
of attributes possessed by a user affects the cost of
creating a credential key, and (b) how the number of
attributes appearing in a disjunct of an access rule
influences the time for generating a rule key. Two sets
of experiments were carried out. In one experiment,
the size of each attribute key is set to 256 bits. The
length of each attribute key is set to 512 bits in the other
experiment. As shown in Fig. 4, the cost of generating
a rule key is much higher than generating a credential
key. This is because creating a rule key also requires
applying the extended Euclidean algorithm to calculate
the matching key. However, the longest time observed
in the experiment (i.e., there are 10 attributes in a rule
50

256-bit key
512-bit key

40
30

5

20
10
0

1

4000

2

3
4
5
6 7 8 9
Number of attributes in a key
(a)

10

256-bit key
512-bit key

3000
2000
1000
0

1

2

3
4
5
6 7 8 9
Number of attributes in a key

10

Related Work

Nabeel and Bertino[21] proposed a scheme for dividing
the access control operations between the data owner
and the cloud provider. The scheme divides the access
control rules into two sets. One set is only visible
to the data owner while the other set is given to the
cloud provider. Thus, the access control policies are
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key and each attribute key is 512 bits) is only about
3500 s. Hence, the credential keys and rule keys can
be generated efficiently.
The last experiment measures the costs of rule
enforcement. The enforcement involves encrypting a
10-byte string using the credential key and decrypting
the encrypted string using a rule key. The speeds of the
encryption and decryption are affected by the sizes of
the keys. The size of a key depends on the number
of attributes in a credential or a rule. According to
Definition 7 in Section 2, the size of a product key is
mn where m is the size of each attribute key and n is the
number of attribute keys used to form the product key.
In this experiment, the credential key is set to contain
10 attributes while the number of attributes in the rule
key varies between 1 and 10.
In the experiments, the size of an attribute key is set
to 256 and 512 bits respectively. According to Fig. 5,
when the size of an attribute key is 256 bits, the longest
time for the enforcement operation is 35 ms. This
appears to be reasonable for any on-line application.
In the worst case (i.e., there are 10 attributes in the
credential key and rule key respectively, and the size of
each attribute key is 512 bits), the enforcement time is
about 249 ms. As discussed in Section 3.10, the cloud
providers can carry out the rule enforcement operations
in advance. That is, the cloud provider pre-computes a
list of users that are eligible to access an asset. Hence,
the rule enforcement operation can be carried out offline. For an off-line operation, 249 ms seems to be
reasonably efficient.

Enforcement time (ms)

Time to generate a key (ms)
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partially hidden from the cloud provider. Different
from Ref. [21], the scheme here hides the access
control policies from the cloud providers completely
by representing the policies in a form that cannot be
understood by the cloud providers. Unlike the scheme
in Ref. [21], this paper also addressed the issue of
delegating access permissions which is important for
many cloud applications.
Many approaches that use cryptographic
mechanisms to enforce access control rules have
been proposed[1, 13, 14] . They usually group data items
based on access control rules and encrypt each group
with a different symmetric key. Then, users can derive
the keys only for the data items they are allowed to
access. Like the scheme in Ref. [21], none of these
schemes address delegating access permissions which
was studied in this paper.
Ye and Khoussainov[10] presented an access control
scheme that allows the access control rules and
credentials to be stored in an obscured form. Different
from the scheme in this paper, Ref. [10] did not allow
access permission delegation. Hence, Ref. [10] is not as
flexible as the scheme in this paper.
Ray et al.[17] proposed a scheme for controlling
the access of files in a hierarchical organisation. The
scheme requires the credential keys of the entities at
the lower levels of the hierarchy contain the keys of the
entities at higher levels of the hierarchy. Thus, a single
entity is needed for generating the keys for all the users
in the system. However, it might not be practical to
find an entity that is trusted by everyone in the system.
Hence, the scheme is not well suited for many cloud
applications. Unlike Ref. [17], the scheme in this paper
allows the users to manage their own keys’ generation.
Thus, it is more flexible to use.
Carrying out access control with hidden credentials
has been studied by many people[11, 22] . These schemes
are based on the identity-based encryption scheme[23] .
In these schemes, the access control policies are used
as keys to encrypt the data. Only the people who
meet the conditions specified in the policies are able to
generate the decryption keys. Frikken et al.[12] improved
the performance of hidden credential schemes. Li and
Li[24] proposed a scheme for hiding the attributes of
the identity during a trust negotiation. They used a
topologically uniform circuit and a committed-integer
based oblivious transfer protocol. All these schemes
have very high running cost. For example, Frikken’s
scheme needs O.mn/ encryption operations and
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O.2 mn/ communications where m is the number of
credentials, n is the number of attributes in a policy, and
 is the number of bits used to represent the attributes.
The cost of running the scheme in this paper is low
as it only needs one encryption and one decryption
operation, and, it does not require the server and the
user to engage in multiple rounds of communications.
Unlike the identity-based encryption schemes[12, 24] , the
scheme in this paper uses a different approach in
generating the credential and rule keys. As a result,
the keys used by the proposed scheme can be generated
more efficiently.
Baden et al.[25] used attribute-based encryption to
ensure the confidentiality of data. They assumed that
all the users share the same set of attributes. In
practice, this requirement might be difficult to be met.
For example, in cloud manufacturing, partners from
different industries might need to collaborate on a
project. These partners are likely to use different
terminologies. Unlike Ref. [25], the scheme proposed
in this paper allows users to use their own attributes
when defining access control rule. Thus, the scheme
in this paper is easier and more flexible for people to
use.
She et al.[8, 26] proposed several schemes for
controlling the flow of information through a composite
service. The schemes do not hide the contents of access
control policies. Confidential policies remain on the
policy’s creator and access control needs to be carried
out by the creator. Different to She’s schemes, the
scheme in this paper hides the contents of the policy
and allows the policy to be checked by cloud providers.
Thus, the proposed scheme incurs less communications
between the users and the cloud providers. Hence, the
proposed scheme is more efficient.
Trust negotiation has been studied in Refs. [9,
27], etc. To minimize the amount of information
disclosed to partners, Winsborough’s scheme requires
the partners exchange their credentials in several
rounds. Squicciarini’s scheme uses substitution and
generalization to minimize and blur the information
exchanged between partners. These schemes did not
intend to hide the policies or credentials. Different
to these schemes, the scheme in this paper completely
hides the contents of the policies and credentials. Thus,
it provides a higher level of privacy.
The access delegation schemes by Liu and Zic[7]
and Xu et al.[6] allow users to delegate their access
permission without changing the system configuration.
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Both schemes did not consider how to delegate
permissions on jointly owned data items. Unlike Refs.
[6, 7], the scheme in this paper used an attribute-based
access control approach. By setting access control
rules, permission delegation for jointly owned assets
can be easily handled in this paper.
Gonzalez-Manzano et al.[28] proposed a model for
handling access control policies of co-owners of jointly
owned object. Their focus is on decomposing objects
and mediating the access control rules of the co-owners
to ensure that the requirements of all the co-owners
can be satisfied. Unlike the scheme proposed in this
paper, the scheme in Ref. [28] does not consider the
confidentiality of data nor the privacy of the access
control policies.

6

Conclusions

The access control scheme in this paper allows access
permission delegation to be carried out easily in a cloud
environment. In the proposed scheme, cryptography is
used to ensure the confidentiality of data, the privacy of
the access control rules, and the credentials required for
access control. The scheme is flexible and easy to use
as it allows users to delegate their access permissions
by (a) assigning user self-defined attributes to their
delegates and (b) specifying access control rules in
terms of the attributes. Access control enforcement and
most of the tasks caused by changing access control
rules and credentials are carried out by cloud providers.
Users’ tasks are limited to generating credential key and
policy keys. Compared with the existing schemes, the
proposed scheme is simple and efficient to use. The
experiments showed that (a) the time for generating an
attribute key is comparable to generating an RSA key,
and (b) when the size of each attribute key is 256 bits,
with no more than ten attributes in the credential or
the access control rule, the policy enforcement can be
carried out in less than 35 ms. The scheme allows the
efficiency of the access control process to be further
improved by pre-computing a list of eligible users for
each asset.
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